

May 14 / Administration of William J. Clinton, 1997

al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (AAT 576–800/801/802/803/804–3), in which Iran agreed to pay the claimants \$3,150,000, and *Lilly Mythra Fallah Lawrence v. The Islamic Republic of Iran* (AAT 577–390/391–1), in which Iran agreed to pay the claimant \$1,000,000.

5. The situation reviewed above continues to implicate important diplomatic, financial, and legal interests of the United States and its nationals and presents an unusual challenge to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order 12170 continue to play an important role in

structuring our relationship with Iran and in enabling the United States to implement properly the Algiers Accords. I shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to deal with these problems and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

The White House,
May 13, 1997.

NOTE: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on May 14.

Remarks on the NATO-Russia Founding Act and an Exchange With Reporters May 14, 1997

The President. Good afternoon. Today in Moscow, we have taken an historic step closer to a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe for the first time in history. The agreement that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov have reached and which we expect to be approved by NATO's governing council this week, forms a practical partnership between NATO and Russia that will make America, Europe, and Russia stronger and more secure. The agreement builds on the understandings that I reached with President Yeltsin in Helsinki. It helps to pave the way for NATO, as it enlarges to take in new members, to build a new relationship with Russia that benefits all of us.

In this century, Europe has suffered through two cold wars—through two World Wars and a cold war. And America has also paid a heavy price. Three years ago at the NATO summit in Brussels, I laid out a vision for a new, different Europe in the 21st century, an undivided Continent where our values of democracy and human rights, free markets and peace know no boundaries; where nations know that their borders are secure and their independence respected; where nations define their greatness by the promise of their people, not their power to dominate or destabilize.

For 50 years, NATO has been at the core of Europe and America's security. From the

start of my first administration, the United States has worked to adapt NATO to new missions in a new century, to open its doors to Europe's new democracies, to strengthen its ties to nonmembers through the Partnership For Peace, and to forge a strong, productive relationship between NATO and a free, democratic Russia. These are goals Republicans and Democrats alike share, building on the legacy of bipartisan leadership in Europe, begun after the war between President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg.

Today's agreement sets out a sustained cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO and Russia will consult and coordinate regularly. Where they all agree, they will act jointly as they are doing today in Bosnia. Russia will work closely with NATO but not within NATO, giving Russia a voice in but not a veto over NATO's business.

I congratulate NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov. I look forward to personally thanking Secretary General Solana for his remarkable work when he visits here next week.

This agreement opens a way for a truly historic signing in Paris next month—or excuse me, it will be later this month now. Let me say that NATO's relationship with Russia is a part

of a larger process to adapt NATO to new circumstances and new challenges in the 21st century. Just 8 weeks from now in Madrid, NATO will invite the first new members to join our alliance. Its doors will remain open to all those ready to shoulder the burdens of membership. The first new members will not be the last.

NATO, working with Russia and other friends of freedom, will see that we work to prevent a return to national rivalries, to defeat new threats to peace and freedom and prosperity, like the ethnic rivalries that have torn Bosnia asunder, terrorism, and weapons proliferation.

This March in Helsinki, President Yeltsin and I agreed that despite our differences over NATO enlargement, the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits to all of cooperation between NATO and Russia were too important to be jeopardized. And we set out the principles for how NATO and Russia could cooperate. Those form the basis for today's agreement, an agreement that proves that the relationship between NATO and Russia is not a zero-sum game and that the 21st century does not have to be trapped in the same assessments of advantage and loss that brought death and destruction and heartbreak to so many for so long in the 20th century.

It is possible to enlarge NATO, to maintain its effectiveness as the most successful defense alliance in history, to strengthen our partnership with Russia, and to do all this in a way that advances our common objectives of freedom and human rights and peace and prosperity. We can build a better Europe without lines or gray zones but with real security, real peace, and real hope for all its citizens. A more secure, peaceful, and hopeful Europe clearly means a better world for Americans in the 21st century.

Thank you.

Russian Cooperation and NATO Expansion

Q. Mr. President, what do you think finally brought the Russians around, if there was one deciding factor? And how much of a problem is it going to be, now that you've got the Russians sort of on board, to convince Congress that NATO should, in fact, be expanded?

The President. Well, let me answer the first question. I think what brought the Russians to this agreement was a sustained effort at dialog between Russia and NATO and between Russia and the United States and other friends of democratic Russia, making it clear that NATO

has a new mission, that there was no attempt to be more threatening to Russia but instead to build a common partnership for democratic values and democratic interests.

Yesterday President Havel of the Czech Republic had a very compelling article in one of our major newspapers, laying out that case. We are not going to define NATO in the 21st century in the same way we did in the 20th century. And we are trying to change the realities that caused so much grief in the last century. I think he understood that, in other words, that a democratic, free, nonaggressive—that is, in a destructive sense—nonaggressive Russia is not threatened by an expanded NATO, particularly now that there's going to be a partnership to work in areas which are in our common interests to work. So that's the first thing.

The second thing I would say is, in terms of the Congress, now that the partnership has been solidified between NATO and Russia, which I think is an important thing on its own merits, it would seem to me to be a great mistake to deny countries that are clearly able and willing and anxious to take on the responsibilities of NATO membership the opportunity to do that. The understandings that we have reached among ourselves about the process of expansion mean that the members themselves are ready to expand. And I believe that in the end Congress will support that, particularly since all of our NATO allies will be voting on to whom new membership will be offered.

Russian Domestic Acceptance

Q. How tough a sell does President Yeltsin have at home with this?

The President. Well, I would hope that the clarifications that were hammered out, first at Helsinki but then the excellent work that Secretary General Solana did, will help President Yeltsin to demonstrate that he has secured an agreement which shows that, while they don't have a veto over NATO actions, that NATO has no plans, no intentions, and has made clear that its mission is not to threaten, confine, or in any way undermine Russia; that we're looking for a partnership here between a democratic Russia and the democracies that are in NATO; and that this, in fact, will strengthen Russia's security and reduce the sense of anxiety that it might have otherwise felt, I believe. And I believe he'll be in a position to argue that to the Russian people now in a forceful way.

But keep in mind, all of us are trying to change the—not only the facts on the ground, if you will, but the whole pattern of thought which has dominated the international politics of Europe for 50 years. And even though the cold war is over, a lot of people want to go back to the kind of—kind of an analysis that was more typical even before World War II, in the late 19th and early 20th century.

And we're trying to change all that. We're trying to prove that democracies can reach across territorial lines to form partnerships that commit themselves not only to preserve freedom within each other's borders and the integrity of those borders but to face these new transnational threats like terrorism, ethnic convulsions, and weapons proliferation.

Military Installations in New Member States

Q. Mr. President, President Yeltsin said that you have made a precise commitment in this document to guarantee that there will be no military installations in the new member states. Have you given those guarantees?

The President. I would urge you, first of all, to look at the language that Secretary General Solana has agreed to and that our representatives have provisionally agreed to just in the last couple of hours. What the language does is to make it clear that there are no plans and

there are no reasons to, in effect, activate old Warsaw Pact military installations for what you might call traditional NATO aggressive forward-posturing but that we will have to use—there is an explicit understanding in the agreement that we will have to use some infrastructure for the agreed-upon operations that are an integral part of being a NATO member.

So all we're doing in the understanding is to recognize, yes, there will be some use of military infrastructure so that the requirements of membership can be met by any new members, but, no, we are not moving the dividing line of Europe from its old dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact further east. So I think we got just exactly the right kind of understanding. And again, I think Secretary General Solana did it right.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:29 p.m. in the Rose Garden at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana; Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia; and President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic. The agreement was formally entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation."

Message to the Senate on Conditions to the Flank Document of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

May 14, 1997

To the Senate of the United States:

I am gratified that the Senate has given its advice and consent to the ratification to the CFE Flank Document and I look forward to the entry into force of this important agreement. It will reaffirm the integrity of one of the CFE Treaty's core provisions and will facilitate progress on CFE adaptation and, thus, NATO enlargement, key elements for advancing United States and European security.

I must, however, make clear my view of several of the Conditions attached to the resolution of advice and consent to ratification, including Conditions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11. These Conditions all purport to direct the exercise of au-

thorities entrusted exclusively to the President under our Constitution, including for the conduct of diplomacy and the implementation of treaties. The explicit limitation on diplomatic activities in Condition 3 is a particularly clear example of this point. As I wrote the Senate following approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a condition in a resolution of ratification cannot alter the allocation of authority and responsibility under the Constitution. I will, therefore, interpret the Conditions of concern in the resolution in a manner consistent with the responsibilities entrusted to me as President under the Constitution. Nevertheless, without